Saturday, August 31, 2019

A Cross-Country Analysis

THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 1 ABSTRACT The role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development has generated considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years. In particular, building effective regulatory structures in developing countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the most appropriate regulatory instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and capacity.This paper explores the role of state regulation using an econometric model of the impact of regulation on growth. The results based on two different techniques of estimation suggest a strong causal link between regulatory quality and economic performance. Key words – economic growth; regulation; governance; developing countries; institutions. JEL classification: C23,I18, L33, L51, L98, O38, O50 2 Acknowledgement We would like to thank three referees for their perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 3 1. INTRODUCTIONThe role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development has generated considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years (e. g. World Bank, 2004). Regulation can take many forms and the form of regulation policy adopted in developing countries has shifted over time (Minogue, 2005). From the 1960s to the 1980s, market failure was used to legitimise direct government involvement in productive activities in developing countries, by promoting industrialisation through import substitution, investing directly in industry and agriculture, and by extending public ownership of enterprises.However, following the apparent success of market liberalisation programmes in some developed countries, and the evidence of the failure of state-led economic planning in developing ones (World Bank, 1995), the role of state regulati on was redefined and narrowed to that of ensuring an undistorted policy environment in which efficient markets could operate. Deregulation was widely adopted, often as part of structural adjustment programmes, with the aim of reducing the â€Å"regulatory burden† on the market economy.Privatisation and the more general process of economic liberalisation in developing countries have produced their own problems and failures and have resulted in the current focus on the regulatory state (Majone, 1994, 1997). The regulatory state model implies leaving production to the private sector where competitive markets work well and using government regulation where significant market failure exists (World Bank, 2001: 1).Arguably, however, the performance of the new regulatory state remains under researched, especially in the context of developing countries with their own peculiar economic and social problems and institutional characteristics. Building effective regulatory structures in de veloping countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the regulatory instruments, it is also concerned 4 with the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and capacity (WorldBank, 2002: 152). Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly provided, and the effectiveness of these regulatory institutions will be an important determinant of how well markets function. The quality of regulatory governance will affect regulatory outcomes, which in turn can be expected to impact on economic growth. This paper explores the role of regulation in economic growth using an econometric model.More precisely, it assesses through econometric modelling the impact of variations in the quality of regulation on economic performance. Although earlier studies have looked at governance as a cause of cross-country productivity or income differences (Olson, et al. , 1998; Kauffman and Kraay, 2002), this paper differs in concentrating on regulation rather than wider governance issues. The results confirm that â€Å"good† regulation is associated with higher economic growth. The rest of the paper is organised as follows.Section 2 reviews issues in the literature pertinent to the debate on the role of regulation in economic growth, before turning to regulatory measures and proxies for the quality of regulation. In section 3 the models used are presented. Section 4 deals with a descriptive analysis of the data and reports the regression results. The results confirm that the quality of state regulation impacts positively on economic growth. development policy. Finally, section 5 provides conclusions and the implications for 5 2. LITERATURE REVIEW (a) Regulation TheoryThe theory of economic regulation developed from the nineteenth century and the literature is now vast (for recent reviews, see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 2000; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Newbery, 1999). The case for economic regulation is premised on the existence of significant market failu re resulting from economies of scale and scope in production, from information imperfections in market transactions, from the existence of incomplete markets and externalities, and from resulting income and wealth distribution effects.It has been suggested that market failures may be more pronounced, and therefore the case for public regulation is stronger, in developing countries (Stiglitz 1998). More recent theoretical contributions to the regulation literature have provided a model of regulation for network industries that recognises the particular structural and institutional characteristics of developing countries and have highlighted the role of effective regulation in achieving equitable and sustainable expansion of infrastructure services in the poorer countries of the world (Laffont, 1999a; 2005).However, regulation of markets may not result in a welfare improvement as compared to the economic outcome under imperfect market conditions. In particular, information asymmetries can contribute to imperfect regulation. The regulator and the regulated can be expected to have different levels of information about such matters as costs, revenues and demand. The regulated agent holds the information that the regulator needs to regulate optimally and the regulator must establish rules and incentive mechanisms to coax this information from the private sector.Given that it is highly unlikely that the regulator will receive all of the information required to regulate optimally to maximise social welfare, the 6 results of regulation, in terms of outputs and prices remain â€Å"second best† to those of a competitive market, which centres attention on barriers to entry (Djankov et al. , 2002). Shapiro and Willig (1990) argue that state ownership provides more information to regulators than private ownership, so contracting should be less problematic when the state both owns and regulates.However, state ownership is associated with inadequate incentives to gathe r and use this information to maximise economic welfare (Hayek, 1945). In other words, there tends to be a trade off between state ownership reducing the information asymmetries and hence transaction costs of regulation and the relative incentives under state control and private ownership for agents to maximise economic efficiency (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Yarrow, 1999).Welfare-improving regulation assumes that the regulatory authority’s actions are motivated by the public interest. This has been criticised by public choice theorists who argue that individuals are essentially self-interested in or out of the public arena and it is necessary, therefore, to analyse the regulatory process as the product of relationships between different groups (Buchanan, 1972). This has been refined in the concept of â€Å"regulatory capture†, which involves the regulatory process becoming biased in favour of particular interests.I n the extreme case, the regulatory capture literature concludes that regulation always leads to socially sub-optimal outcomes because of â€Å"inefficient bargaining between interest groups over potential utility rents† (Newbery, 1999: 134; also, Laffont, 1999b). In the Chicago tradition of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), regulators are presumed to favour producer interests because of the concentration of regulatory benefits and diffusion of regulatory costs, which enhances the power of lobbying groups as rent seekers (Reagan, 1987). 7Regulation is also subject to â€Å"political capture†; indeed, political capture may be a much greater threat than capture by producer groups outside of the political system. Where political capture occurs, the regulatory goals are distorted to pursue political ends. Under political capture, regulation becomes a tool of self-interest within government or the ruling elite (Stiglitz, 1998). More generally, it is to be e xpected that both the process and outcomes of a regulatory regime will be determined by the specific institutional context of an economy, as reflected in its formal and informal rules of economic ransacting (North, 1990). By setting the â€Å"rules of the game†, institutions impact on economic development (World Bank, 2002; Rodrik et. al. , 2004). Economic development is seen not simply as a matter of amassing economic resources in the form of physical and human capital, but as a matter of â€Å"institution building† so as to reduce information imperfections, maximise economic incentives and reduce transaction costs. Included in this institution building are the laws and political and social rules and conventions that are the basis for successful market production and exchange.In particular, relevant modes of conduct in the context of the regulatory state might include probity in public administration, independence of the courts, low corruption and cronyism, and tradit ions of civic responsibility. â€Å"Institution building† including building a â€Å"good† regulatory regime is one of the most difficult problems facing developing countries and the transition economies at the present time (Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2004). (b) Regulatory Quality and Development OutcomesThe outcome of a regulatory system can be assessed against the yardsticks of effectiveness and efficiency. Effective regulation achieves the social welfare goals set down by the government for the regulatory authority. In developing countries, the social welfare objectives of regulation are likely to be not simply concerned with the pursuit of economic 8 efficiency but with wider goals to promote sustainable development and poverty reduction. Efficient regulation achieves the social welfare goals at minimum economic costs.The economic costs of regulation can take two broad forms: (1) the costs of directly administering the regulatory system, which are internalised within government and reflected in the budget appropriations of the regulatory bodies; and (2) the compliance costs of regulation, which are external to the regulatory agency and fall on consumers and producers in terms of the economic costs of conforming with the regulations and of avoiding and evading them (Guasch and Hahn, 1999). Regulatory quality can also be assessed in terms of the criteria for good governance. Parker (1999: 224) argues that a well-functioning regulatory system is one that balances accountability, transparency and consistency. Accountability requires the regulatory agencies to be accountable for the consequences of their actions, to operate within their legal powers, and to observe the rules of due process when arriving at their decisions (e. g. to ensure that proper consultation occurs). Transparency relates to regulatory decisions being reached in a way that is revealed to the interested parties.The third process which provides regulatory legitimacy is consistency. Inconsistent regulatory decisions undermine public confidence in a regulatory system. Inconsistency leads to uncertainty for investors, which raises the cost of capital and may seriously damage the willingness to invest. Since political intervention tends to undermine regulatory consistency, and politicians may be prone to alter the regulatory rules of the game for short-term political advantage, consistency is a primary argument for some kind of â€Å"independent† regulator.This discussion suggests that the capacity of the state to provide strong regulatory institutions will be an important determinant of how well markets perform. An economy with a 9 developed institutional capacity is more likely to be able to design and implement effective regulation, which should contribute to improved economic growth. Weaknesses in institutional capacity to deliver ‘good’ regulation may be predicted to affect adversely economic development (World Bank, 2002). Evidence on th e quality of regulation in developing countries is limited though growing.But where research has occurred, the evidence suggests that the results of state regulation have been disappointing. A recent study of 13 Asian countries found that 80% of regulators had no access to training and regulatory offices were usually understaffed. The report concludes: â€Å"Asia’s governments rely too much on under-equipped and unsupported independent regulators to carry out tasks that are beyond their capabilities† (Jacobs, 2004: 4). In Latin America there is often a lack of political support for independent regulation and a lack of commitment to maintaining regulatory independence (Ugaz, 2003).In the context of Africa, it was found that â€Å"regulation is being examined as part of individual sector initiatives, but these efforts are uncoordinated, and implementation is being left to follow privatization instead of being put in place concurrently† (Campbell-White and Bhatia, 1998: 5). A similar pattern of regulatory weaknesses can be discerned in the evidence for individual countries. In India, regulatory structures are associated with acute failures in institution building and with a bureaucratic approach that curtails enterprise (Lanyi, 2000).South Africa’s proliferation of regulatory bodies is associated with a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities and with the adoption of policy-making roles independent of government (Schwella, 2002: 3). In Malawi, the electricity industry regulator remains closely connected to the state electricity industry, compromising any notion of real regulatory independence and encouraging capture. 2 In Sri Lanka, the policies governing the regulatory process are judged to have been ad hoc and based on short-term political interests, with deficiencies apparent at each stage of 10 the process (Knight-John, 2002).Experiences in the transitional economies also demonstrate much variability in the performance of the newly established regulatory institutions (Cave and Stern, 1998). In recognition that not all is well, the World Bank (2001: v) has stressed the importance of â€Å"improving regulatory regimes and building institutions and capacity effectively to supervise the private sector†. The Asian Development Bank (2000: 18) has also emphasised the need for improved regulation. Several papers have identified the causal effects of better governance on higher per capita incomes in the long run, using regressions with nstrumental variables on a cross-section of countries (Barro, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kauffman and Kraay, 2002). The causal chain between governance and economic outcome has also been examined. Some studies find that the quality of governance and institutions is important in explaining rates of investment, suggesting that one way in which better governance can improve economic performance is by improving the climate for capital creation (World Bank, 2003; Kirkpatrick , Parker and Zhang, forthcoming,). Olson et al. 1998) find that productivity growth is higher in countries with better institutions and quality of governance. Kauffman and Kraay (2002) reinforce these findings, relating the quality of governance to economic outcomes using a data set covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01. (c) Measures of Regulatory Governance The literature suggests, therefore, that the ability of the state to provide effective regulatory institutions will be an important determinant of how an economy performs. The major variable of interest is the quality of regulation.Other researchers have operationalised the 11 broader concept of governance using two different groups of variables. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data set is produced annually and covers three aspects of government – bureaucratic quality, law and order and corruption (Political Risk Services, 2002). Each variable is measured on a points scale with higher points denoting b etter performance with respect to the variable concerned. The assessment is based on expert analysis from an international network and is subject to peer review.The ICRG variables have been used as proxies for the quality of governance in research (Neumayer, 2002; Olson et al. , 1998). The second set of governance variables comprises a set of six aggregate indicators developed by the World Bank and drawn from 194 different measures (Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). These indicators are based on several different sources (including international organisations, political and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non-governmental bodies) and a linear unobserved components model is used to aggregate these various sources into one aggregate indicator. The indicators are normalised with higher values denoting better governance. The six indicators provide a subjective assessment of the following aspects of a country’s quality of governance: Voice and accountability: res pect for political rights and civil liberties, public participation in the process of electing policy makers, independence of media, accountability and transparency of government decisions. Political instability: political and social tension and unrest, instability of government.Government effectiveness: perceptions of the quality of public provision, quality of bureaucracy, competence of civil servants and their independence from political pressure, and the credibility of government decisions. 12 Regulatory quality: burden on business via quantitative regulations, price controls and other interventions in the economy. Rule of law: respect for law and order, predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary system, enforceability of contracts. Control of corruption: perceptions of the exercise of public power for private gain.The focus of this study is on regulation rather than governance. We therefore use the two variables in the World Bank data set that come closest to capturing t he quality of the outcome and process dimensions of regulation, namely the regulatory quality and government effectiveness indices. The regulatory quality index measures the regulatory burden on business associated with inefficient quantitative controls and can be taken as a proxy for the quality of the outcomes of applying regulatory instruments. The government effectiveness index measures the quality of ublic provision, competence of civil servants and the credibility of government decisions, and can therefore act as a proxy for the process dimensions (consistency, accountability, transparency) of regulatory governance. The objective of the empirical analysis reported below, in section 3, is to test for a causal link between regulation quality and economic performance. The approach is to adopt a growth accounting framework, where economic growth is used as the measure of economic performance and regulation is entered as an input in the production function.Neoclassical growth model ling began with the work of Solow (1956), who employed a neoclassical production function to explain economic growth in the USA during the first half of the twentieth century. Important assumptions of this approach are constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to investment, which imply that for a given rate of saving and 13 population growth economies move towards their steady-state growth path. This can be extended to differences in income levels between countries, to argue that in the long run income per capita levels will converge.A lack of empirical support for convergence and the presence of a large, unexplained â€Å"residual† factor in the function estimates have presented a major challenge to these models. The endogenous growth theory put forward by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) led to renewed interest in economic growth analysis. An important advantage of endogenous over traditional growth models is that, through the assumption of constant or increasing retu rns to a factor input, in particular human capital, it is possible to explain a lack of growth and income convergence between countries and to account more fully for the residual factor in Solow-type analyses.The â€Å"growth accounting† exercises, popularised by Barro and others (Barro, 1991, 2000; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), fall within the generalised Solow-type growth model. An important characteristic of this Most empirical approach is the inclusion of various indicators of economic structure. research using this approach has found evidence of â€Å"conditional† convergence, where convergence is conditional on the level or availability of complementary forms of investment, including human capital and a supportive policy environment.This suggests that the failure of developing countries to converge on the income levels of developed countries may be attributed, at least in part, to institutional factors. 4 The importance of institutional capacity for the design and implementation of effective economic policy has been demonstrated in various empirical studies of cross-country growth, for example Sachs and Warner (1995) and Barro (2000). A similar approach is adopted in this study to examine the role of regulatory institutional capacity in accounting for cross-country variations in economic growth.An issue that needed to be addressed at the outset is causality. It could be argued that instead of regulatory quality determining economic growth, regulatory quality could be determined 14 by the economy’s growth rate. Economies that grow faster are able to generate higher levels of income and are therefore able to support the development of better institutions. Or, alternatively, there may be a level of simultaneity, in the sense that institutional quality generates more sustained economic growth, which in turn supports more and better regulatory institutions.The Granger causality test is commonly used in empirical work to establish the di rection of causation. However, this test is sensitive to the length of lags of the variables used and therefore requires a relatively long time series dimension to be able to select the right length of lag and to be relatively confident about the conclusion drawn. Since the time dimension of our regulation data is limited, we are unable to apply the Granger causality test.Fortunately, there is a substantial literature that indicates that better governance leads to higher income rather than causation being in the opposite direction (Olson et al 1998; Acemoglu et al 2000; Rodrik et al 2004). Kauffman et al (2005: 38) implement an empirical procedure for testing for causation, which leads to the identification of strong positive causal effects running from better governance to higher per capita incomes and suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in governance leads to a two- to three-fold difference in income levels in the long run. The authors state, ‘Some observers ha ve argued that †¦.. here is a strong causal impact of income on governance. However, we argue that the existing evidence does not support a strong causal channel operating in this direction – most of the correlation between governance and per capita income reflects causation from the former to the latter’ (Kauffman et al 2005, p3). They conclude: â€Å"available evidence suggests that the causal impact of incomes on governance is small. Rather, the observed correlation between governance and per capita incomes primarily reflects causation in the other direction: better governance raises per capita incomes†.However, we accept that because we are unable to rigorously demonstrate causation in our modelling, the results should be read with this caveat. 15 Endogeneity is another issue that should be addressed. To cope with the possible problem of endogeneity, a 2SLS or IV technique can be used. But to to do this effectively requires good sets of instruments for the variables that potentially could suffer from this problem, including lags of the variables concerned. Once again, data availability, particularly relating to the regulatory proxies, does not permit an effective test for endogeneity.We accept that this remains a weakness. 3. THE MODELLING The approach used in the modelling is to assume that each country’s production possibility set, in common with most literature in this area, is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function: Yit Ait K it Lit (1) where Y is the output level; A, level of productivity; K, stock of capital; and L, stock of labour – ‘i’ and ‘t’ stand for country and time respectively. Assuming that the production function exhibits constant return to scale with respect to physical inputs, (2) can be written in per capita terms as: yitAit k it (2) where lower case letters refer to per capita units. Assume a simple Keynesian capital accumulation rule according to the following s pecification: 16 dk / dt sy (n )k (3) where dk/dt is the rate of change of the per capita capital stock, which is assumed to be equal to the flow of saving (equal to investment) minus capital depreciation and the growth of the labour force. In this equation s is the share of gross saving in output per capita, is the depreciation of capital and n the rate of growth of population as a proxy for the growth of the labour force.Setting (3) equal to zero gives us the steady state solution for the stock of per capita capital; k=sy/(n+ ). Taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (2) and replacing the steady state solution for k from above into (2) gives the steady state solution for output per capita, which is as follows: * ln ( yit ) [1/(1 )][ln Ait ln ( sit /(nit it )] (4) Where (*) above the variable signifies the steady state solution. We adopt the Mankiw et al. (1992) assumption that economies move towards their steady state solution according to the following approximation: n yi t lnyi 0 * (lnyit lnyi 0 ) (5) where y0 stands for the initial level of per capita income, and (1 e t ) is the adjustment dynamic towards steady state, where ‘ ‘ is the speed of convergence. From (5) we can solve for the growth of per capita output, which is as follows: 17 git * ( / t ) (lnyit lnyi 0 ) (6) * Replacing ( lnyit ) by its equivalent from (4), gives us a relationship for actual growth of per capita output: git ( / t (1 ))[ln Ait ln( sit /( nit it )] ( / t )lnyi 0 (7) Total factor productivity plays an important role in growth. We assume that ts dynamic takes the following form: Ait Ai 0 e it (8) Where Ai0 specifies the initial level of productivity and ‘ ’ its rate of efficiency growth per period. Substituting for A from (8) into (7), per capita growth of output (g) is represented by the following relationship: g 1 ln Ai 0 2 i 3 ln( sit /(nit it )) 4 lnyi 0 (9) where 1 / t (1 ), 2 /(1 ), 3 / t (1 ), and 4 / t. Adding some control and qualitative variables as well as a stochastic term to (9) provides the model which we use to assess the role that regulatory quality plays in economic growth. 18Variables added to equation (9) broadly follow the growth empirics literature, such as Barro (1991, 2000), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). Amongst the control variables included in most empirical research are initial conditions, both in terms of the level of development (as proxied by GDP per capita) as well as human capital and institutions. Most also include proxies for the macroeconomic environment such as inflation, trade openness and the government’s involvement in economic activities. Qualitative variables can also be added to account for specific events in a country, as well as data heterogeneity when panel data are used.In our analysis, depending on the nature of data set constructed, we make use of all or some of these variables with the aim of ensuring that our regressions are appropriately specified. In the cont ext of our specification in (9), similar to Temple and Johnson (1995), we make the additional assumption, drawing on the literature relating to regulation in developing countries reviewed earlier, that the rate of efficiency growth ’ ’ directly varies with the quality of regulatory institutions in the country.Those countries with good institutions in place can design and implement policies that allow them to continue with their future growth. If instead the country in question lacks or has a weak institutional structure, its growth potential is likely to be diminished because the design and implementation of appropriate policies are then adversely affected. In the case of developing countries, in particular, to be able to benefit from being a latecomer in terms of industrialisation and grow at a high speed to â€Å"catch up†, it is important that institutional supports are present to realise the potential for income convergence.One of the control variables that is likely to be important in this context, is initial institutional quality. In the absence of better information about the initial institutional quality, we adopted 19 educational attainment as a proxy variable. At first reading this may seem an unusual choice, but our proxy, secondary school enrolment, is correlated with the regulatory governance variables we are using (see Table 1 below) and it has been successfully used as a proxy in other studies. 5 The finding that education is highly correlated with our regulatory variables is an nteresting finding in itself and one worthy of exploration in future research. We apply two methods of estimation to the model specified by equation (9). One is based on cross-section analysis, in which we attempt to measure directly any possible impact that regulation has on economic growth. The second is based on panel data, in which we indirectly estimate the growth contribution of regulation. The reason for applying different estimation procedure s is due to our data on the indexes of regulation; we have a few observations per country.Therefore, for the cross-section regression we average the relevant data over the period 1980-1999 and combine the result with the regulation data. 6 This allows a direct measure of the possible role that regulation plays in growth, using equation (9) as a base to estimate 2 . In the second method we adopt a variant of the one applied by Olson et al. (1998) and apply the fixed effects technique7 to the panel data constructed. This data set combines cross-section and time-series data for the countries included in the first data set.This procedure, which essentially involves including a dummy for every country in the estimated equation, produces consistent estimates even where data are not available for some time-invariant factors that affect growth. The fixed effects estimator does require, however, that each included variable varies significantly within countries. Clearly, even if available, th e regulatory variables may not satisfy this requirement since institutions usually change slowly. The estimation procedure, therefore, involves two stages. We first regress GDP per capita growth in each country per period, git on ln ( sit /(nit it it ) plus a set of country dummies. The coefficient on the country dummies reflects the effect on growth of all the 20 time-invariant variables, including regulatory institutions. In the second stage we use the coefficients of the country dummies as the dependent variable and regress them on the measures of regulatory quality and control variables. The coefficients on the measures of regulatory quality in the second stage regression reflect the impact of regulation on GDP per capita growth after controlling for capital accumulation and certain other variables. 4. THE DATA AND THE REGRESSION RESULTSData for the regulatory quality measures were set out in Kauffman et al (2005) and are available for downloading from the World Bank web site. 8 As discussed earlier, the two regulation indicators used from this study are regulatory quality and government effectiveness measures. Other data required for the regression analysis were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The data set used in the analysis covers 117 countries for the cross-section regression and 96 for the panel version of the regression (for a full list of the countries see the Appendix).Although the main focus of the study is the impact of regulation on economic performance in developing countries, a heterogeneous data set was used including some transitional and advanced countries as well as developing ones. The reason for including some nondeveloping countries was to improve the statistical reliability of the results by including more countries, with regional dummies used to capture the differing levels of economic development. However, as a cross-check on our results we repeated our analysis removing the developed countries from the data base. The results were substantially unaffected (these results can e obtained from the authors). As information on regulatory governance is only 21 based on one year, in the cross-section model, all other variables were converted into one period by averaging for 1980-2000. Initial effect variables relate to 1980. For the panel version, the data cover the period 1980-2000 (in common with most empirical research in this area, and in order to remove short-term disturbances as well as business cycle effects from the data, we have converted the time series data for the variables into 5-year period averages covering 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94 and 1995-99).However, the time series dimension is not complete for a number of the countries in the data set and therefore the panel data are unbalanced, containing 432 observations. Table 1 provides the correlation coefficient matrix for the key variables used in the study. (Table 1) The first data column in Table 1 shows the simple correla tion coefficients between the dependent variable, GDP growth per capita, and possible explanatory variables. The correlation coefficients have the expected signs.The correlation coefficients between the indicators of regulatory governance, namely government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and GDP per capita growth have the expected positive sign. The bivariate correlations between inflation and the regulatory proxies used are negative, supporting the proposition that economies with better regulatory governance are also better able to design macroeconomic policies that stabilise the economy and control inflation.There is also a high correlation between the logarithm of initial GDP per capita and initial secondary school education, both of which are in turn correlated with the various proxies for regulatory governance. 9 This suggests that, included in the same regression, parameter estimates for these variables may not be individually reliable, due to multicolinearity. This is also the case with the two regulatory proxies that we intend to use in the analysis, namely government 22 effectiveness (GE) and regulatory quality (RQ). These two are highly correlated and herefore cannot be included in the same regression in order to estimate each variable's contribution. For this reason we considered first the contribution of each of these proxies to growth in separate regressions, and then combined them by addition to form a composite regulation variable (RQGE). Before formal analysis of the model specified in (9), we checked for the possibility of convergence in our data. In general, the literature does not support unconditional convergence (Barro, 2000; Mankiw et al. , 1992; Islam, 1995) but instead finds evidence of conditional convergence. We investigated this issue using regulatory governance as a ossible pre-condition for convergence. Table 2 presents the results. There is no indication of unconditional convergence (Reg. 1 and 2), the sign on the initial G DP per capita variable (LIGDPPC) is positive. However, once an indicator of governance is included (RQ, GE and RQGE), as in Reg. 3 to 5, there is an indication of conditional convergence in the form of a negative sign. Differences between growth experiences of countries are partly explained by their state of regulatory quality. There is no indication that there is any significant regional difference in this context (cf. reg. -8, which include regional variables for Africa, Asia and Latin America). (Table 2 here) In addition to combining the two regulatory proxies (RQ and GE), and in the light of high correlation between the two, the first principal component of these two was generated (PCRQGE) and this composite index was used as a regulatory proxy. Results generated based on this proxy, as indicated by Reg 5a in table 2, are the same as those reported using 23 RQ, GE and RQGE10. We repeated this process taking into account the other four indicators of governance identified by Kauff man et al (2005) and detailed earlier.The first principal component of all the six indicators of governance (termed PC All) was generated, as well as one based on the four, excluding RQ and GE – termed PC Others. Reg 5b and Reg 5c in Table 2 include the results based on these composite indexes. Inclusion of the four indicators of governance alongside or instead of the two regulatory proxies combined (RQGE) and its principal component (PCRQGE) has a marginal effect on the parameter estimates for the other variables in the regression, but the signs remain the same. The coefficient values for PC All and PC Others are, however, lower than for the other regulation variables.We interpret this result as being an indication of the differential influence of different governance proxies on growth. In other words, a possible criticism of our findings that various measures on institutional quality could be highly correlated and that it is institutional quality rather than the quality of regulation in particular that matters is not borne out. More precisely, the regulation proxies we have used (RQ, GE, RQGE and PCRQGE) seem to have a higher impact on growth than the other four indicators of governance identified by Kauffman et al (2005) reflecting wider institutional factors.Therefore, regulation rather than governance issues more generally seems to have the larger impact on growth. 11 Having considered the issue of convergence and considered the possible relative effects of regulation and governance issues more generally on growth, Tables 3 and 4 report results based on the formal analysis of the data. The results address the main focus of the research, the impact of regulation on the growth in GDP per capita. The results reported in Table 3 are based on the model specified in equation (9) using OLS and cross-country data, as detailed above.Table 3 reports ten regressions, each containing different combinations of the independent variables in our data set. The econ omic variables in the full set of regressions 24 tested included the variables derived from the model itself, as specified in equation (9), and measures for general inflation, trade, government expenditure, as well as the regional dummies. However, with the exception of inflation these other variables proved to be statistically insignificant at the 10% level or better and therefore, to economise on space, the results are not reported.The inflation variable was found to be statistically significant and negative, suggesting that unstable macroeconomic conditions have a negative effect on economic growth. (Table 3 here) The regional dummies were used to test the hypothesis that different regions may have characteristics that affect growth differently. This is validated with respect to Asia, confirming that this region had, on average, performed better with respect to economic growth than other regions in the period studied. A dummy for Africa and Latin America were found to be statisti cally insignificant. We also included the initial level of human apital, as measured be secondary school enrolments, as a proxy for the initial level of â€Å"institutions†. As indicated in Table 1 this variable is highly correlated with initial GDP per capita, and the results in Table 3 confirmed that it has a negative sign and is statistically significant. This result supports the conditional convergence hypothesis. The regulatory variables are correctly signed and statistically significant in all cases. The sign and level of significance of the parameter estimates for these regulatory proxies indicate that they have a statistically significant and positive effect on economic growth.Based on the estimates for the combined regulatory variable (RQGE), a unit change in the quality and effectiveness of regulation is, on average, associated with approximately an 0. 6% to 0. 9% 25 increase in economic growth, everything else remaining equal. As with the other results reported, th e regulatory proxies used here seem to have a larger impact on growth than do the other governance proxies, namely the variables PC All and PC Others. One objection to our analysis so far is that we have used regulatory data for 2000 only. Perhaps the regulatory environment has changed substantially during the period 1980-2000.Unfortunately, World Bank regulatory data do not exist prior to 1996. But as a cross-check on the stability of the results if regulatory data for other years from 1996 are used, we first considered the correlation between the World Bank regulatory indicators between 1996 and 2000. The results gave correlation coefficients of 0. 92 to 0. 99 confirming a high degree of stability. Nevertheless, we then re-ran our regression reported in Table 3 using regulatory indicators (constructed as before) but for 1996, 1998 and 2000 separately. The results were almost identical.As discussed earlier, the stability in the governance variables plus the very limited observation s on governance (a maximum of two for each country) caused us to rule out the use of regressions based on panel data. (Table 4 here) Table 4 reports results based on the second method of estimation, which, as discussed earlier, involves two stages. In the first stage, by applying a fixed effect technique to the panel data, we arrive at the following regression results: GDP per capita = 0. 133 Log net12 gross capital formation – 0. 148 Log initial GDPPC (6. 41)* (6. 57)* 26 +0. 4 Log net schooling + Country Dummies (1. 84)** Adjusted R2 =0. 21; number of observations=432 The figure in brackets is the t-ratio; * (**) indicates significance level at 5% (10%). From the above, the regression parameter estimate associated with the country dummies is saved and used as the dependent variable in the regressions reported in Table 4. For reasons of space we report only a sub-set of the full results. We exclude reporting regressions including the full set of independent variables used, a s detailed in Table 1, because a number of them proved to be statistically insignificant.Our main interest in the regression results reported in Table 4 is with the role that the regulatory proxies are playing in explaining the variation in the country dummies. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 3. Even though the parameter estimates for the regulatory variable are lower, regulatory governance still affects the growth performance of an economy. The regional dummies in this case are all negative and statistically significant, relative to the control group which is advanced countries13.These changes in the results were investigated and seem to reflect the differences in the modelling methods adopted, suggesting that in this type of research the modelling can affect the results. Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges is that the quality and effectiveness of regulation has a positive effect on growth using both models. 27 5. CONCLUSIONS The provision of a re gulatory regime that promotes rather than constrains economic growth is an important part of good governance. The ability of the state to provide effective regulatory institutions can be expected to be a determinant of how well markets and the economy perform.The impact of regulatory institutions on economic growth will depend on both the efficiency of the regulatory policies and instruments that are used and the quality of the governance processes that are practised by the regulatory authorities, as discussed in the early part of the paper. This paper has tested the hypothesis that the efficiency and quality of regulation affects the economic performance of an economy. Two proxies for regulatory effectiveness were included separately and then combined as determinants of economic growth performance, using both cross-sectional and panel data methods.The results from both sets of modelling suggest a strong causal link between regulatory quality and economic growth and confirm that the standard of regulation matters for economic performance. The results are consistent with those of Olson et al. (1998) who found that productivity growth is strongly correlated with the quality of governance, and Kauffman et al (2005) who found that the quality of governance has a positive effect on incomes. As we highlighted earlier, the proxies we use for regulatory governance are correlated with a number of other institutional proxies.One could argue, therefore, that what we have established could equally hold for the link between institutional capacity in general and economic performance. However, the literature reviewed earlier in the paper is consistent with institutional capacity playing a strong and complementary role to regulatory governance 28 and the principal component analysis undertaken is supportive of this view. Nevertheless, the ability to model separately institutions in general and regulatory institutions or governance in particular remains problematic because of their potential complementarity.Hence, our results are perhaps most safely interpreted as demonstrating the importance of regulatory quality for economic growth in the context of wider institutional capacity building. Also, we acknowledge that in our analysis there is no control for the different regulated industrial sectors including privatised industries. Hence, the results need to be interpreted with care because of the heterogeneity of the sectors covered. The possibility that regulatory quality inputs differently across different industrial sectors cannot be ruled out.Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from pursuing this issue. Finally, we acknowledge that the direction of causation between economic growth and regulatory quality deserves further investigation, Nevertheless, despite these caveats, we believe that there are good a priori grounds for assuming that better regulation leads to more rapid economic growth and that our empirical results are consistent with the view that â€Å"good† regulation is associated with higher economic growth in lower-income economies. 29 APPENDIX (a) List of countries included in the dataset14:Angola; Albania; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Benin; Burkina Faso; Bangladesh; Bulgaria; Belarus; Bolivia; Brazil; Botswana; Canada; Switzerland; Chile; China; Cote d'Ivoire; Cameroon; Congo, Rep. ; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Algeria; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep. ; Spain; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; United Kingdom; Georgia; Ghana; Guinea; Gambia; Greece; Guatemala; Guyana; Hong Kong (China); Honduras; Croatia; Haiti; Hungary; Indonesia; India; Ireland; Iran, Islamic Rep. Iceland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kyrgyz Republic; Korea, Rep. ; Lebanon; Sri Lanka; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Latvia; Morocco; Moldova; Mexico; Macedonia; Mali; Malta; Mozambique; Mauritius; Malawi; Malaysia; Niger; Nigeria; Nic aragua; Netherlands; Norway; New Zealand; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Papua New Guinea; Poland; Portugal; Paraguay; Romania; Russian Federation; Senegal; Singapore; Sierra Leone; El Salvador; Sweden; Syrian Arab Republic; Togo; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Tanzania; Uganda; Ukraine; Uruguay; United States; Venezuela; Vietnam; Congo, Dem.Rep. ; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 30 NOTES 1. The World Bank defines good governance as â€Å"epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; a strong civil society participating in public affairs, and all behaving under the rule of law† (World Bank, 1997). 2. 3. One of the authors of this paper has been involved in the design of regulatory institutions for Malawi.This expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved common component of governance, plus a disturbance ter m to capture perception errors and sampling variation in each indicator. 4. However, neither neoclassical nor endogenous growth theory gave regulation an explicit role. By assuming that output is at the limit provided by the available factor inputs and technology, neoclassical growth theory implicitly assumed no regulatory distortions. 5. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) argue that the initial level of human capital can affect the growth path of productivity.Olson et al (1998) also use secondary school enrolment as a proxy explanatory variable in their growth study. 6. The most recent data set provided by Kauffman et al (2005) provides bi-annual data on indicators of governance over the period 1996-2004. In common with most empirical research in this area, we have converted time series data on the variables we have used in this study into 5-year averages for the period 1980-2000. However, if we were to do the same with the regulatory indices available it would give us only one observatio n for each country. If we were to extend our data to 2004, we would get two observations on these indices.Time dimensions of data on regulatory governance in either case would be too few to be able to apply panel data. In addition, given that these indicators change very slowly over time, as also acknowledged by Kauffman et al. , and that they only relate to the most recent periods, we do not find it informative to try to use them in a panel data analysis. We were able to confirm the stability of the regulation variables by replacing the data for 2000 with data for 1996 and 1998. The effect on our results was negligible (the results can be obtained from the authors). 7.There are two estimation procedures for panel data, fixed and random effects. In our case, the fixed effect method is the more appropriate one to use for the following reasons: (a) a priori we expect that 31 regulatory governance proxies to be correlated with the intercept term for each country; those with a poor or w eak regulatory governance are also expected to perform relatively badly in terms of economic performance; (b) we are interested in measuring differences between countries included in our data set; the parameter estimate for country dummies (the intercept term for each country) is a proxy for these differences.Intercepts in turn are used as a dependent variable in the second stage regression to establish the link between regulatory governance and country characteristics captured by the intercept term. The fixed effects method allows us to do this; (c) in small samples, similar to the one we are using here, there may be practical problems preventing parameter estimation when the random effect model is applied; this is not the case with the fixed effect model. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Verbeek (2000).Also, we applied the Hausman specification test and this confirmed that the fixed effect model is the more appropriate technique for our data. 8. http://www. worl dbank. org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4. html The series constructed are composite indexes, which are based on a number of variables generated at different points in time. Information for each country on these proxies, therefore, generally relates to a period rather than a specific year. Kauffman and Kraay (2005) highlight certain issues relating to the quality of the data used, particularly when it is utilised for making comparisons across countries.However, we are not aware of better regulatory quality data, while conceding that better quality data could reveal different results to those reported here. Nevertheless, based on the significance level of the relevant variables in our regressions, we are fairly confident that any differences in the results would relate to the magnitude of these effects rather than their sign. 9. A number of the explanatory variables were logged. In the literature the basic growth accounting model is generally exponential (e. g. Cobb-Douglas).Once lo gged, it becomes a linear relationship which can then be estimated. For the other explanatory variables in our model, logging helped to solve problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 10. The difference in parameter estimates for the regulatory index is due to the scale effect generated by the weight used in calculating the first principal component of the two indicators. 11. However, we would not wish to over-emphasise the importance of this result given the data limitations as pointed out in Kauffman et al (2005).One could also argue that different proxies may have different dynamic effects on growth and that broader indicators of governance may require a longer period of time to produce their full effect on economic growth. 32 12. Net in this case applies to the log difference of different investment shares in GDP (physical and human in this case) and (d+n+g), where d is the rate of depreciation of capital per annum; n is the rate of population growth and g is a prox y for rate of technical change. As is the practice in the literature, (d+g) is assumed to be 5%. The specification is based on a Solow/Augmented Solow model. 3. In this model the regional dummies identify whether there are regional similarities or differences between regions. 33 REFERENCES Acemoglu D. , Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. (2000). ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’, American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369-1401 Asian Development Bank (2000). Asia Development Report, Manila: ADB. Averch, H. & Johnson, L. L. (1962). ‘Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint’, American Economic Review, 52: 1052-69. Bailey, E. E. (1973). Economic Theory of Regulatory Constraint, Lexington, DC: Heath. Barro, R. J. (1991).Economic Growth in a cross section of countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106:407-33. Barro, R. J. (1997). Determinants of Economic Growth: A cross-country empirical study, Development Discussion Paper No. 579, Harvard Institute for International Development. Barro, R. J. (2000). Inequality and growth in a panel of countries, Journal of Economic growth, 5(1): 5-32. 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(2002). ‘Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring around the World', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2884, Washington, DC: World Bank. Chong A. and Lopez-de-Silanes F. (2005) Privatization in Latin America : Myths and Reality. Stanford : Stanford University Press and World Bank 35 Clague, C. , Keefer, P. , Knack, S. & Olson, M. (1995). ‘Contract-intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights and Economic Performance’, Working Paper No. 151, University of Maryland: Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS). Cook, P. & Kirkpatrick, C. (2003). Assessing the Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries’, in eds. D. Parker and D. Saal, International Handbook on Privatization, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, USA. De Castro, A. S, Goldin, I & da Silva, L. A. P. (2002). ‘Relative Returns to Policy Reform: Evidence from Controll ed Cross-Country Regressions’, mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank. Djankov. , S. , La Porta, R. , Lopez-de-Silanes, F. 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Jacobs S. (2004). ‘Governance of Asia Utilities; New Regulators Struggle in Difficult Environments’ The Governance Brief, issue 10, ADB Governance and Regional Cooperation Division: Bangkok. Kauffman, D. & Kraay, A. (2002). ‘Growth Without Governance’, mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank. Kauffman D. , Kraay A. & Mastruzzi M. (2005). ‘Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’ World Bank, May 7 Kirkpatrick, C. & Parker, D. (2004). ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment and Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries’ Public Administration and Development 24,4: 333-344 Kirkpatrick, C. & Parker, D. (2005). ‘The Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and the Policy Lessons†™, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 41, no. 4, pp513-41. Kirkpatrick C. , Parker D. , & Zhang Y-F. (forthcoming). ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure: Does Regulation Make a Difference? ’ Transnational Corporations. Knight-John, M. (2002). The Institutional Policy Framework for Regulation and Competition in Sri Lanka’, Working Paper No. 40, Centre on Regulation and Competition, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester. Laffont J-J (1999a) ‘Competition, Regulation and Development’ in B. Plescovic and j. Stiglitz (eds. ) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998, Washington DC: World Bank, 237-257 Laffont, J. -J. (1999b). Incentives and the Political Economy of Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laffont J-J (2005) Regulation and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Laffont, J. -J. Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, M ass. : MIT Press. 38 Laffont, J. -J. & Tirole, J. (2000). Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. Lanyi, A. (2000). ‘The Institutional Basis of Economic Reforms’, in eds. S. Kahkonen and A. Lanyi, Institutions, Incentives and Economic Reforms in India, New Delhi and London: Sage Publications. Levy, B. & Spiller, P. T. (1994). ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10 (2): 201-46. Lucas, R. E. (1988). On mechanism of economic planning’ Journal of Monetary Economics, 21 (1): 3-42. Majone, G. (1994). ‘The Emergence of the Regulatory State in Europe’, West European Politics, . 17: 77-101. Majone, G. (1997). ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State’, Journal of Public Policy, 17 (2): 139-67. Mankiw, N. D. , Romer P & D. Weil (1992). ‘A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Gro wth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107: 407-37. 39 Minogue M. (2005). Apples and Oranges – Comparing International Experiences in Regulatory Reform, Occasional Lecture 13, Bath: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, University of BathNeumayer, E. 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Friday, August 30, 2019

The impact of hosting the World Expo 2020 on Dubai’s future economic, social and cultural life

Introduction This proposal outlines the following research question: in what ways, positive or negative, will the World Expo 2020 affect Dubai, the surrounding region, and the world in generalThis is an interesting topic for two primary reasons. The first is the personal workplace experience of the author, which involved a position at Dubai Media Incorporated (Dubai TV) conducting analysis about current affairs in the UAE region. The second is the fact that this is a landmark moment in the history of Dubai, the UAE, and the Middle in general, as it is the first time that an international exposition has been held in the region. It is possible that it will lead to the development of new forms of culture; the old may be reformulated and developed in unique ways, but it may also be fused with ideas and institutions from abroad to create novel cultural hybrids. This idea of bringing regions of the Middle East together with the rest of the world was explicitly supported by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Dubai’s leader, who argued for the importance of ‘a renewed vision of progress and development based on a shared purpose and commitment’ (Expo 2020 Dubai, UAE, 2013). The possibility that the Expo 2020 will be a crucible for interacting creative forces across the world is, moreover, encapsulated in Dubai’s chosen theme: ‘Connecting Minds, Creating the Future’ (Big News Network, 2013). Research questions This research will aim to answer the following questions: What factors are likely to contribute to the success or failure of the World Expo 2020? What are the social, economic, and cultural changes that Dubai is a likely to experience? How will be Dubai’s future in the global stage change as a result of this event? How might Dubai use the World Expo 2020 as a marketing tool? How might Dubai use the symbolic economy to aid its cultural and urban regeneration and shape its new urban identity? Will Expo 2020 commentary and press show Dubai in a positive or negative light? Literature review Due to the very recent nature of the announcement, there is almost no literature dealing directly with the relationship between Dubai and the Expo 2020. However, there has been considerable commentary in the form of political and economic punditry, much of which is academic. Piers Schreiber, Vice President of Corporate Communications & Public Affairs at the Jumeirah Group, claimed that ‘the Expo will create up to 270,000 jobs in the region, bringing great economic and social benefits’ (cited in Wilson, 2013). Among these are an injection of roughly ˆ17.7 billion into the economy and a migration of talent from abroad (Wilson, 2013). These estimations are supported by the forecasting group Oxford Economics, which claims that the event will contribute nearly $40 billion to Dubai’s GDP and create 277,000 new jobs over the next seven years (Big News Network, 2013). A similar argument is put forward by Rose and Spiegel (2009), whose work suggests that ‘mega ev ents’ lead to a substantial increase in trade (approx. 30%); however, they also show that ‘unsuccessful bids to host the Olympics have a similar positive impact on exports†¦trade is attributable to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games, rather than the act of actually holding a mega-event’ (p1). Although Sheik Mohammed has claimed that the â€Å"Dubai Expo 2020 will breathe new life into the ancient role of the Middle East as a melting pot for cultures and creativity† (Big News Network, 2013), the goal of cultural diversity has been questioned due to the strong emphasis on boosting an ‘Islamic economy’, which suggests continuity more than change (Wilson, 2013). Based on comparisons with other ‘mega events’, it is often argued that the effects of the Expo 2020 are likely to be negative for Dubai. Rose and Spiegel (2009), for example, stress that much of the evidence for the benefits of mega events is commis sioned by groups with biasing agendas (e.g., Humphreys and Plummer, 1995; Fuller and Clinch, 2000, both cited in Rose and Spiegel, 2009). The same is argued by Nitsch and Wendland (2013), who also point to the large initial investment in facilities and infrastructure associated with mega events, which can place a considerable burden on the local or national economy; there tends also to be a dramatic and unpredictable effect on property prices. The conclusion of Nitsch and Wendland (2013) is that mega events tend to have an overwhelmingly negative effect on population growth (i.e., a population decline), as measured relative to a control group. However, Nitsch and Wendland (2013), and Rose and Spiegel (2009), point to the difficulty of estimating the impact of major events. Problems quantifying the effects, especially on phenomena such as labour markets, are often exacerbated by the fact that many studies are commissioned ex ante by biased groups. Moreover, in conducting analyses suc h as this, it is difficult to find an adequate sample size due to the infrequency of mega events. Then there are problems with the intangibility of cultural and social spillover effects, as well as the economic multiplier (Rose and Spiegel, 2009). Methodology The effects of the Expo 2020 are best assessed using a variety of methodological approaches, employing both quantitative and qualitative methods. From the quantitative side there will be content analysis-case studies and statistical analyses. From the qualitative, there will be surveys, questionnaires, and interviews. In terms of research philosophy (or methodology, strictly speaking), this research will take both an objectivist and a subjectivist approach (Crotty, 1998). It would be advantageous to use what Nitsch and Wendland (2013: 4) call a ‘difference-in-differences methodology’. This draws ‘before and after’ comparisons, and in this case would entail looking at the effect of former Expos on host nations and cities and extrapolating about the probable effects on Dubai. Bibliography Crotty, M. (1998) The foundation of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in Research Progress. Sage Publications: London Big News Network (Nov 2013) Dubai wins right to host Expo 2020 http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/218715287/scat/3a8a80d6f705f8cc/ht/Dubai-wins-right-to-host-Expo-2020 [Retrieved 03/02/2014]. Nitsch, V. and Wendland, N. (2013) The IOC’s Midas Touch: Summer Olympics and City Growth, CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 4378, Centre for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute. Expo 2020 Dubai, UAE (2013) Our Bid http://expo2020dubai.ae/en/our_bid [Retrieved 03/02/2014] Rose, A. K. and Spiegel, M. M. (2009) The Olympic Effect, NBER Working Paper No. 14854, The National Bureau of Economic Research http://www.nber.org/papers/w14854 [Retrieved 03/02/2014]. Wilson, J. A. J. (Dec 2013) Global Islamic Economy Summit and World Expo 2020 boost Dubai’s Halal credentials, The Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/jonathan-aj-wilson/global-islamic-economy_b_4366436.html [Retrieved 03/02/2014].

How Did Shakespeare Portray the Concept of Honor in Henry Iv Part 1

How did Shakespeare portray a concept of honour in Henry IV part 1? In this world, there exists, since the dawn of civilisation of mankind, a thing that we are fighting and dying for—that is honour. Shakespeare explores the theme of honour in Henry IV part 1 in a rather interesting way by having it presented in a different form varying from character to character. Henry IV wants to protect his honour by using any means available to vanquish the rebels, his sinful act to King Richard also keeps haunting him and shakes his own faith in his honour.While his son’s dishonourable acts in the beginning of the play wearies him further. Superficially, one may think Prince Hal is a typical young slacker whose life has been fully lured by the glamorous but immoral world of liquor,gambling, prostitution and crime, the truth is, unbeknownst to anyone, the prince is scheming to reform himself from an idler into a more responsible and competent heir to the throne. Here, his vision of honour of behaving like the royal is an impetus for him to seek new behaviour which will bring him more merits, making him an honourable figure the status he deserves.Or Hotspur, honour is everything, ironically more valuable than his wife. His excess obsession of honour induces many political mistakes, most notably his decision to confront the king at Shreswbury despite having less number of troops. In other words, Hotspur’s passion for honour blinds him from the reality. For all his chivalry and valor in the battle, Hotspur is proved to fail at being a military strategis as well as effective leader. It is none other than the lazy, unscrupulous and coward Sir Falstaff whose existence in the play represents the values that totally oppose the fore-mentioned concepts of honour.His disenchanted view on honour can make the audiences see that the reason behind other characters’ action are single-minded and irrational or more poignantly worthless. Overall, the exhilaration o f the play partially arises from Shakespeare’ way of presenting honour in various forms, paralleling the play to the real world where different people all know honour with different interpretation. King Henry IV whose name is the title of the play, is not in fact the protagonist, however the play speculates what has occurred during his turbulent reign. In Richard II, the audiences see him as dynamic and brave, indicating his kingly qualities.All the audiences must then be bewildered upon seeing him in this play. Suspicious, stressful and sick was the king after all dishonouralbe acts he did to King Richard previously. Shakespeare tries to explore how the sin of being viciously dishonourable comes back to haunt its perpetrator. Despite the king’s regret of what he did to Richard and his passion to redeem himself by going to crusade, this sin seems to block all the means for the king to purify himself. The rebellion of the Percys and rebellious nature of his son led him to grow very ill.Act one scene one, he moaned about his son and mistakenly praises Hotspur’s qualities, saying that Hotspur is â€Å"a son (of Percy) who is the theme of honour’s tongue, implying that Hal brings him with nothing but shame and disgrace. His anger even drives him further to contemplate that if he only and Northumberland could switch sons, â€Å"would have I (himself) his Harry and he mine. Fortuantely, in the end the king gains back honour by defeating the rebels and his son, who used to represent everything he scorns and acts dishonourably, has redeemed himself and proves to be an effective warrior.Henry Momouth or affectionately known as Hal is an interesting character as well as complex. At the beginning,the audiences see Hal as a drunken idler who acts nothing like an heir to the throne. Unexpectedly, Hal, in Act 1scne 2< makes it clear that he doesn’t plan to live the rest of his life in this world of immorality, in fact he claims that he i s pretending to be this sort of person then when the right moment comes, he is going to transform himself into a person with all characteristics of the king. Reformation, glittering over faults, will do more goodly and attract more eyes† expresses his prediction that his â€Å"reformation† would make his subjects surprises and therefore gains more popularity for him which is necessary in order to keep the kingdom stable. Hal has a vision that the great honour of being king will at the eventually fall on him whether he likes it or not. This vision of future honour is the impetus of Hal’s self-reformation. Henry Hotspur was a renowned warrior whose actions and decisions all have been influenced by the concept of honour.Unlike other characters, Hotspur’ was too obsessed with honour, resulting in a single-minded decision making. For all his chivalry, Hotspur was an utter political failure. Act 4 Scene 1, despite possessing less troops, HOTSPUR, without opening his mind for Worcester and Vernon’s suggrstion, decided to confront the king’s troops the next day. Moreove, this sort of obsession makes Hotspur far from being diplomatic. Whenever he is angry, he always bursts and doesn’t listen to anyone but himself. All this proves that, comparing to Hal, he is not deserved to wield the power.However, despite these differences, he and Hal share only one common belief in one respect of honor. Both of them make it clear that in order for one to gain honor, another one must die first. â€Å"Harry to Harry shall, hot horse to horse, meet and never drop til one dropped a corpse† said Hotspur in Act 4 scene 1 before the battle of shrewsbury. This line best exemplified the fore-mentioned point. Falstaff lacked any sort of honur. â€Å"what is honur? A word†, expressed Flastaff, demonstrating his disenchanted attitude towards honour.Although having been opposing this concept, at the end of act 5 scene 4, Falstaff seem s to be sel-contradictory when he commented that he would embrace a new and more honourable lifestyle only if he gains honor and status after the battle. From this, it is clear that Falstaff would embrace the concept of honour only if honor comes to him first. Therefore he does not oppose honour for ideological reason but rather for practical reason as through out the play honour in anyform doesn’t seem to come to him‘ In conclusion, different characters in this play have different concepts of honour How Did Shakespeare Portray the Concept of Honor in Henry Iv Part 1 How did Shakespeare portray a concept of honour in Henry IV part 1? In this world, there exists, since the dawn of civilisation of mankind, a thing that we are fighting and dying for—that is honour. Shakespeare explores the theme of honour in Henry IV part 1 in a rather interesting way by having it presented in a different form varying from character to character. Henry IV wants to protect his honour by using any means available to vanquish the rebels, his sinful act to King Richard also keeps haunting him and shakes his own faith in his honour.While his son’s dishonourable acts in the beginning of the play wearies him further. Superficially, one may think Prince Hal is a typical young slacker whose life has been fully lured by the glamorous but immoral world of liquor,gambling, prostitution and crime, the truth is, unbeknownst to anyone, the prince is scheming to reform himself from an idler into a more responsible and competent heir to the throne. Here, his vision of honour of behaving like the royal is an impetus for him to seek new behaviour which will bring him more merits, making him an honourable figure the status he deserves.Or Hotspur, honour is everything, ironically more valuable than his wife. His excess obsession of honour induces many political mistakes, most notably his decision to confront the king at Shreswbury despite having less number of troops. In other words, Hotspur’s passion for honour blinds him from the reality. For all his chivalry and valor in the battle, Hotspur is proved to fail at being a military strategis as well as effective leader. It is none other than the lazy, unscrupulous and coward Sir Falstaff whose existence in the play represents the values that totally oppose the fore-mentioned concepts of honour.His disenchanted view on honour can make the audiences see that the reason behind other characters’ action are single-minded and irrational or more poignantly worthless. Overall, the exhilaration o f the play partially arises from Shakespeare’ way of presenting honour in various forms, paralleling the play to the real world where different people all know honour with different interpretation. King Henry IV whose name is the title of the play, is not in fact the protagonist, however the play speculates what has occurred during his turbulent reign. In Richard II, the audiences see him as dynamic and brave, indicating his kingly qualities.All the audiences must then be bewildered upon seeing him in this play. Suspicious, stressful and sick was the king after all dishonouralbe acts he did to King Richard previously. Shakespeare tries to explore how the sin of being viciously dishonourable comes back to haunt its perpetrator. Despite the king’s regret of what he did to Richard and his passion to redeem himself by going to crusade, this sin seems to block all the means for the king to purify himself. The rebellion of the Percys and rebellious nature of his son led him to grow very ill.Act one scene one, he moaned about his son and mistakenly praises Hotspur’s qualities, saying that Hotspur is â€Å"a son (of Percy) who is the theme of honour’s tongue, implying that Hal brings him with nothing but shame and disgrace. His anger even drives him further to contemplate that if he only and Northumberland could switch sons, â€Å"would have I (himself) his Harry and he mine. Fortuantely, in the end the king gains back honour by defeating the rebels and his son, who used to represent everything he scorns and acts dishonourably, has redeemed himself and proves to be an effective warrior.Henry Momouth or affectionately known as Hal is an interesting character as well as complex. At the beginning,the audiences see Hal as a drunken idler who acts nothing like an heir to the throne. Unexpectedly, Hal, in Act 1scne 2< makes it clear that he doesn’t plan to live the rest of his life in this world of immorality, in fact he claims that he i s pretending to be this sort of person then when the right moment comes, he is going to transform himself into a person with all characteristics of the king. Reformation, glittering over faults, will do more goodly and attract more eyes† expresses his prediction that his â€Å"reformation† would make his subjects surprises and therefore gains more popularity for him which is necessary in order to keep the kingdom stable. Hal has a vision that the great honour of being king will at the eventually fall on him whether he likes it or not. This vision of future honour is the impetus of Hal’s self-reformation. Henry Hotspur was a renowned warrior whose actions and decisions all have been influenced by the concept of honour.Unlike other characters, Hotspur’ was too obsessed with honour, resulting in a single-minded decision making. For all his chivalry, Hotspur was an utter political failure. Act 4 Scene 1, despite possessing less troops, HOTSPUR, without opening his mind for Worcester and Vernon’s suggrstion, decided to confront the king’s troops the next day. Moreove, this sort of obsession makes Hotspur far from being diplomatic. Whenever he is angry, he always bursts and doesn’t listen to anyone but himself. All this proves that, comparing to Hal, he is not deserved to wield the power.However, despite these differences, he and Hal share only one common belief in one respect of honor. Both of them make it clear that in order for one to gain honor, another one must die first. â€Å"Harry to Harry shall, hot horse to horse, meet and never drop til one dropped a corpse† said Hotspur in Act 4 scene 1 before the battle of shrewsbury. This line best exemplified the fore-mentioned point. Falstaff lacked any sort of honur. â€Å"what is honur? A word†, expressed Flastaff, demonstrating his disenchanted attitude towards honour.Although having been opposing this concept, at the end of act 5 scene 4, Falstaff seem s to be sel-contradictory when he commented that he would embrace a new and more honourable lifestyle only if he gains honor and status after the battle. From this, it is clear that Falstaff would embrace the concept of honour only if honor comes to him first. Therefore he does not oppose honour for ideological reason but rather for practical reason as through out the play honour in anyform doesn’t seem to come to him‘ In conclusion, different characters in this play have different concepts of honour

Thursday, August 29, 2019

Stateless People - Illegal immigrants in the U.S Essay

Stateless People - Illegal immigrants in the U.S - Essay Example Alternatively, immigration can also be referred to instances where an individual who was previously granted a legal entry into a country stays longer than the stipulated time that he/she was allowed. Illegal immigration may also occur when the immigrants goes against the laws that they were admitted with into that particular country this maybe through the acts of engaging in illegal activities or any other action that contravenes the immigration laws of that nation. (LeMay, 2007).2 Most advanced economies nations are often faced with the problem of illegal immigration into their borders some of the immigrants end up in illegal activities like drug peddling or even terrorist attacks which negatively impact the homeland security of those specific nations. Moreover, it is also common place for these countries to receive visitors from other countries who come on visitation purposes but in the long run end up staying longer that they were legally granted thus turning out to be illegal immigrants. USA is known to be a destination for smuggling of human beings especially through the border with Mexico whereby people from as far as Latin America utilizes that route to gain access to the country with the hope of a better life owing to the stable economic condition that America has enjoyed for a considerable period of time. The issue of immigration has been so rife given the increased numbers of illegal immigration that take place across the borders annually and the federal government has to spend a considerable amount of the taxpayers money to arrest prosecute and even deport those immigrants to their respective countries of origin (Kenney, 2008).3 Illegal immigrants who cross into the territory of the United States if America are often undocumented people thus are regarded as stateless since they do not conform to any particular governing body. In essence, they are not

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Retail Design and Retail Merchandising Thesis Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Retail Design and Retail Merchandising - Thesis Example The retail business group has been at the receiving end of numerous innovations that are being produced in the process of the evolution of architectural features. Foremost of these are those new technologies and theories that will help attract new and retain current customers for future business operations. In addition, the profile of the modern customer has also evolved and diversified, demanding more from their purchases and more from the establishment that they get these merchandises from. The offshoot is that retail specific features have become essential to creating a competitive edge over business rivals. Generally, the two major design components that a retailers store must focus on are i) the physical design of the interior (walls, structures, etc.) and ii) The design of a favorable environment for effective visual communications.(Retail Systems, n.d.) Thus a good retail unit must be able to create the synergy between technologies and design to achieve optimal delivery of consumer service and increased margins in the business. Some of the specific inventions in retail system designs are (i) reliable and secure systems based on efficient automation and (ii) environmentally friendly and cost effective solutions (Salvador, et al., 2006). Every retail store needs to address multiple aspects of design issues ranging from systems that ensure customer retention to the mechanisms that effectively monitor shoplifting and employee pilferage. The most basic aspect in providing a memorable shopping experience for the customer is keeping the store and its surroundings neat and clean. Though thorough maintenance is the least expensive method in attracting and retaining the customers, it is found to be the most difficult to effectively implement and maintain. The above facts highlights why lighting is crucial in the design of the retail

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

Economy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words - 8

Economy - Essay Example Rising interest rates will devastate the government and would become much expensive for the local government to borrow cash, and home loans will be out of reach for citizens except for the very wealthy, by next year. Consequently, US may be wiped out financially, thus, bring the economic activities to a standstill (National Bureau of Economic Research 45-6). The Federal Reserve has strived to keep US interest rates debt at a low level, and they have succeeded. Until recently, investors and nations around the world continue to participate in this system regardless of the fact that the federal system is not honest. However, there are indications that too many foreign direct investors are lastly outsourcing their investments to other countries. For instance, China and Russia have been dumping US regime debt. Other direct investors are Renowned investors like Jim Rodgers say he will dump 30years of US government bonds. When investors put such comments forward, there is a high probability that by 2013, US will have few direct foreign investors. The decline of the dollar will lead to reduced consumption and will shift consumer expenditure from imported goods to domestic goods and services while supplementing demand in domestic products with increased exports. Unfortunately, the lower dollar value is expected to last longer than anticipated. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that the budget deficit will approximate to 5.2% of the GDP in the coming years. It is more likely that foreign lenders like China will not continue lending money to US. Due to the reduced demand and decline of the dollar, the trade deficit will decline. The loss of reverse status will be disastrous for the dollar value. Foreigners will rash to get out of the dollar, either through outright currency conversion or through bidding up the US goods value as they rash to unload the dollar holdings. Though it is hard to tell

Monday, August 26, 2019

Wk 2 discussion 2 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Wk 2 discussion 2 - Essay Example Hodges is already implementing in her classroom, and which would be deemed effective and beneficial for students like Ernest are the: (1) planning pyramid, where contents that students will learn would be classified according to: (a) contents that all students will learn; (b) contents that most students will learn; and (c) contents that few students will learn (in Ernest’s case, Ms. Hodges could discern which contents would be most applicable for learning within his intellectual level; (2) nine types of instructional adaptations where Ms. Hodges could tailor and identify the â€Å"the difficulty level of lessons, structure how students participate and provide responses, and provide peer support for learning mate† (Rosenberg, Westling, & McLeskey, 2007, par. 6); and (3) provision of peer tutoring. As revealed, peer tutoring would be beneficial for Ernest to focus on relevant course materials that would be used for class discussion and for examinations. Rosenberg, M. S., Westling, D. L., & McLeskey, J. (2007). Can You Help Me with This Student? In M. S. Rosenberg, D. L. Westling, & J. McLeskey, Special Education for Today’s Teachers: An Introduction (p. 222). Prentice

Sunday, August 25, 2019

How are our oceans Are there plenty of fish in the sea Research Paper

How are our oceans Are there plenty of fish in the sea - Research Paper Example The other major problem that has resulted in the displeasing state of the oceans as it stands currently is the issue of overfishing. This vice has also resulted in the reduction of the viable offspring of the major fish species that are endangered, resulting in further endangerment of the marine life (NRDC, 2011). Further, the oceans have now become a source of health risk for the human population, owing to the sedimentation of the plastic, heavy metals and other pollutants in the beaches and in the rivers, which eventually finds way into human homes. The result is that there is a high risk of health associated with the ocean pollution (NRDC, 2014). In this respect, the state of the ocean is not suitable is not in good shape, and thus there is a need to address this problem, lest the ocean eventually fails to support life. Are there plenty of fish in the sea?   The saying that there is plenty fish in the ocean does not hold any more in the modern world. This is because, with the cu rrent trend of ocean pollution and dangerous fishing practices, there will be virtually no wild fish in the oceans by 2050 (NGS, 2014). One of the major problems that are causing the decline in the population of the fish in the oceans is the high demand for seafood globally, considering that fish meat is not associated with high cholesterol levels. Thus, combined with the effects of pollution in the ocean and the subsequent climate change, the whole environmental setting has become less supportive for marine life.

Saturday, August 24, 2019

Mythological strategy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Mythological strategy - Essay Example Stories of lovers, who are not able to consummate their love in this world because of hindrances like economic or racial differences, die and become flowers or other things finally finding the freedom to express their love to each other helps explain the hope one can have in the afterlife despite the difficulties experienced in this world. The reality that is difficult to understand and accept in such a tragic event which is observed in real life brings a reader to feelings of hopelessness especially when he is experiencing similar situations. However, the consummation of a love in another world gives hope and lets a person understand the meaning of such circumstances. In mythological strategies, archetypes offer help to the readers in understanding further what is commonly observed in real situations. If a story has a hero who conquers all difficulties and villains, one is also present in real life. As villains are common in stories, life is not lacking of them. Characters and event s one could always relate to in trying to figure out life, are parts and parcels of archetypal analysis which are commonly used in mythological strategies.

Friday, August 23, 2019

SIOP Lesson Plan Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

SIOP Lesson Plan - Essay Example 3. Handout of comprehension passages. 4. A leaflet containing a list of difficult vocabulary and their meaning. 5. A history kit or a worksheet (please see appendix 1). Motivation: A documentary or transparencies on one of the battles is shown to the students before beginning the activity. A transparency can be shown having the chronology of the battles. Simple and straight questions that can be connected to the content in the passages. The students are allowed to interact before answering the questions. Let the three groups have an interactive discussion about the outcome of battles. Presentation: Try to present the students how the past wars can be related to the present wars. How wars are started and the positive and negative effects of a war. An equation between quantum of loss incurred and misery caused to the population due to wars as against the benefits and allow the students to analyse. The students are allowed to exchange notes and do peer evaluation so that they will understand each other's writing styles and at the same time are encouraged to question each other about the answer they chose and discuss. A discussion about the present wars in comparison to the past makes them understand how content can be useful in learning language skills. Exchanging notes and interaction between the groups leads to the integration of language skills. The teacher first explains the sequence of the activity with examples. Practice: An information gap activity is presented to all the three groups. The three groups are given a passage with fill in the blanks on three different battles. Since all the members in the group are aware of the events the groups are allowed to interact and seek answers... The students are allowed to exchange notes and do peer evaluation so that they will understand each other's writing styles and at the same time are encouraged to question each other about the answer they chose and discuss. A discussion about the present wars in comparison to the past makes them understand how content can be useful in learning language skills. Exchanging notes and interaction between the groups leads to the integration of language skills. An information gap activity is presented to all the three groups. The three groups are given a passage with fill in the blanks on three different battles. Since all the members in the group are aware of the events the groups are allowed to interact and seek answers and fill in the blanks with right answers. Each student from the group is asked to select one battle and make a very short oral presentation before the class. The content of the presentation need not be entirely based on the true text but can relate to the other aspects of the war. (The students are given time to make notes before the presentation).

Thursday, August 22, 2019

My Vision for holistic nutrition Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

My Vision for holistic nutrition - Essay Example While holistic nutrition does not make any claims that a certain food, or a vitamin or mineral contained therein, will cure any degenerative disease, for instance cancer, adequately giving the body what it needs will help the body to heal itself. In holistic nutrition every person is viewed as an individual with different nutritional needs. The Holistic community believes that many variables play a role in establishing what may be a normal nutritional requirement, resulting in a â€Å"tailored† nutritional chart for individuals based on their needs. In contrast, Allopathic medicine looks at the population as a whole; it determines the norm based on an average requirement and applies that calculation to the individual, regardless of biochemical, environmental and physical differences. Holistic nutrition, as mentioned earlier, looks at the person as a whole, keeping the differences in body systems (neurological, structural, immune, reproductive, etc.) in view, and helps deal with the various challenges facing the body for optimal nutritional functionality. For example, instead of approaching depression, skeletal pain, and fatigue as three separate issues, thus calling for three separate prescriptions, a holistic nutriti onist will look at these three different weaknesses on the whole: what do they have in common and what systemic condition could be causing it. Such an approach treats the systems of the body as being interconnected and seeks to improve the health of the person on the whole. Holistic nutrition teaches that food is the best medicine. Dietary intake and supplements are important considerations when seeking to prevent illnesses or to strengthen a body already in crisis. Prescriptions medication may quiet or silence the symptoms of illness, but may not be able to identify and correct the root cause of the illness, which, in turn, will continue to weaken the body. A holistic

Planning and Enabling Learning Essay Example for Free

Planning and Enabling Learning Essay This rationale focuses on the four areas of ‘Negotiating with Learners’, ‘Inclusive Learning’, ‘Integrating Functional Skills’ and ‘Communication’. During my research I will draw upon a range of sources which include the internet, books, organisation media (leaflets) and lessons learned. Teaching processes should be cooperative between the student and tutor. To this end tutors should plan strategies like initial assessments, agreeing on learning goals and possible actions to be taken by in order to empower learners to achieve these goals. Petty, G (2009, p530) states: â€Å"Each learner is unique and has individual needs. If the needs of our learners are discovered, the chances of success are greatly increased.† thus as a starting point initial assessments should be carried out prior to commencing a programme of education. Different learners have different learning needs and tutors must know their learners well to judge these requirements. This could be undertaken via a range of questions during the enrolment process, forms or/and questionnaires. Information obtained should be kept confidential so learners feel free to disclose as much information about themselves and their learning needs as possible. Agreeing goals and actions should be accomplished between learners and tutors. The effect being the learner will also feel that his/her views and opinions are being heard and taken into consideration. The advantages to the tutor being that the learner understands their responsibility to advance their own education and tasks/objectives/deadlines required to do so. The tutor should monitor the process to make sure learners reach their learning targets along the way and amend goals by agreement setting new actions when objectives are not reached.